I use variation across markets in the timing of television's introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout. The estimated effect is significantly negative, accounting for between a quarter and a half of the total decline in turnout since the 1950s. I argue that substitution away from other media with more political coverage provides a plausible mechanism linking television to voting. As evidence for this, I show that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio, and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys. I also show that both the information and turnout effects were largest in off-year congressional elections, which receive extensive coverage in newspapers but little or no coverage on television.
I Introduction
Television was first licensed for commercial broadcasting on July 1, 1941. By 1960, 87 percent of American households had television sets and they were watching an average of five and a half hours per day [Television Bureau of Advertising 2003] . Contemporary observers anticipated a "revolution" in politics, pointing to an "infinite broadening of the democratic process... giving all Americans a clearer understanding of trends and issues" [Mickelson 1960 ], a "new direct and sensitive link between Washington and the people" [Stanton 1962 ], and "a better medium for truth" [Taft 1951 ].
What took place in the years after television's introduction was not a broadening of the democratic process, but rather a sharp decline in political participation. Average presidential turnout in both the 1980s and 1990s was lower than in any decade since the 1920s, and outside the south (where a substantial remobilization of black voters muted the decline) it was lower than in any decade since the 1820s. 1 The decline in turnout is especially striking since many legal barriers to voter registration were dismantled during the same period, and education and income-both positively correlated with the propensity to vote-increased substantially. 2 Numerous books have been written about this decline. 3 It has been indicted as a threat to American democracy and a symptom of broader disengagement of Americans from the lives of their communities [Teixeira 1992; Putnam 2000] . It is, according to one source, "the most important, most familiar, most analyzed, and most conjectured trend in recent American political history" [Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 57] .
In this paper, I use plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of television's introduction to show that it significantly reduced voter turnout, accounting for between a quarter and a half of the aggregate decline since mid-century. I also show that television caused sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio, that it reduced citizens' knowledge of politics as measured in election surveys, and the effects on both turnout and information were largest in relatively local elections.
These latter facts point toward crowding out of local political information as a possible mechanism linking television and turnout. George and Waldfogel [2005] argue that growth of national media can cause substitution away from local news sources, and document this by showing that in 1 These turnout figures are based on Rusk [2001] . McDonald and Popkin [2001] offer a more precise calculation of the number of eligible voters beginning in 1948, adding corrections for ineligible felons and eligible voters living overseas. They find that these corrections eliminate the slight negative trend in turnout after 1972 that earlier data showed. The corrections do not eliminate the sharp drop in turnout between 1960 and 1972, however, and do not change aggregate voting during the period I study. 2 The combination of falling turnout and changing demographics was the basis of an article by Brody [1979] entitled "The Puzzle of Political Participation in America." The legal changes over this period are summarized by Kleppner [1982, p. 122-123] and Teixeira [1992, p. 29-30] . Teixeira estimates that based on changing demographics alone, voter turnout should have been 3.9 percent higher in 1988 than in 1960. 3 See Kleppner [1982] , Teixeira [1992] , Piven and Cloward [2000] , and Patterson [2003] .
localities where the New York Times has expanded in recent years, readership of local newspapers fell among educated readers. They speculate that one result of this crowding out may have been reduced participation in local elections. 4 Television in the 1950's and 1960's was similar to the New York Times in that its political coverage was primarily national, and we would expect it to cause similar substitution away from local news. Furthermore, since television was a dramatic improvement in the quality of entertainment available to most households, it may also have reduced the total time devoted to news consumption. This would reduce turnout in both local and national elections. 5 To identify the effect of television, I take advantage of three historical facts. The first is that television was introduced to different markets at different times, with the earliest and latest cities separated by more than ten years. Although the timing was far from random, two exogenous events-World War II and the imposition of a licensing freeze between 1948 and 1953 (caused by technical problems with spectrum allocation)-added an important element of idiosyncratic variation. The second is that when television was introduced, it grew rapidly. In many markets, penetration went from zero to seventy percent in roughly five years, and even in the earliest years the average television household was watching more than four hours per day. The third is that television stations from a given city broadcast over a large area. Even though the earliest television cities were also the largest and wealthiest, their signals reached a heterogeneous group of counties including many that were small and rural. This allows me to eliminate spurious correlation between the timing of television and shocks to voting by controlling for flexible functions of time interacted with county demographics, and by looking at changes in voting within demographically similar groups of counties.
The first set of results quantifies the effect of television on turnout. In panel regressions with county and time-region fixed effects, I find that television reduced voter turnout, and that the effect was significantly larger in off-year congressional elections (when the only races are at the state, district, or local level) than in presidential election years. The result is robust to including fourthorder polynomials in time interacted with observable county characteristics, as well as controls for changes in observable characteristics over time. It also remains when the analysis is performed on subsets of counties with similar characteristics. Overall, I estimate that television reduced off-year turnout in an average county by 2 percent per decade after it was introduced, and that television explains half of the total off-year decline in turnout since the 1950's. The effect on presidential-year turnout is smaller-accounting for roughly a quarter of the total decline-and is not significantly 4 In an earlier version of the same paper, George and Waldfogel present evidence that in cities where the New York Times grew rapidly, turnout among educated voters fell in off-year but not presidential year elections [George and Waldfogel 2002] . 5 For evidence on the link between information and turnout more generally, see the theoretical literature reviewed by Feddersen [2004] and empirical analyses by Gant [1983] , Gerber and Green [2000] , and Lassen [2005] . different from zero.
The second set of results show that crowding out of information provides a plausible mechanism linking television and voting. One approach is to document the extent to which television caused substitution away from newspapers and radio. I confirm that television news provided less political information than either of these other media, and that the gap was larger for information about congressional races. I then document the dramatic decline in newspaper and radio use which television caused. A second approach is to look directly at measures of political knowledge. I use data from the 1952 National Election Study to show that respondents in counties with television were less likely to be able to name candidates running in the election, with the strongest and most significant effects for congressional elections. A third approach is to look for an exogenous variable that shifts the amount of information about local congressional races provided by television and ask whether this also changes the intensity of the turnout effect. The variable I consider is the number of congressional districts within a television market. The more districts a market is divided into, the more congressional races are taking place in a given election year, and the less local stations should be able to cover any one race. Although the results for the effect of districts on survey measures of information show no significant effects, the effect on turnout is exactly as predicted: having more districts increases the magnitude of television's effect in off-year congressional elections but does not change the effect in presidential years.
These findings contribute to a growing economic literature on the link between media and voter behavior. 6 DellaVigna and Kaplan [2005] study the impact of introducing the Fox News cable channel and find a small positive effect on the vote shares of Republican candidates, as well as some evidence of a positive effect on voter turnout. Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel [2001] show that minority voter turnout is higher in counties with larger minority populations, and attribute the difference to the ability of minority-targeted media to deliver campaign messages. Stromberg [2004] presents evidence that penetration of radio in the New Deal period increased turnout in gubernatorial elections, an interesting finding that contrasts with the effect of television documented here. One possible explanation is that technological features of radio (for example, the fact that it is possible to read and listen at the same time) meant that it caused less substitution away from newspapers. This is consistent with aggregate trends in newspaper circulation per capita which show a sharp downward trend beginning when television was introduced but no similar trend around radio's introduction. Radio also had more political coverage than television, and may have represented a greater improvement in the availability of information, especially in rural areas. 6 I will not attempt to review the large political science literature on media and voter behavior. See Graber [2000] for a survey. One study of particular relevance is Prior [2004] , who uses data on television in the 1950s to argue that it increased the incumbency advantage. A second is Althaus and Trautman [2005] , who use recent cross-sectional data to show that large television markets fragmented over many congressional districts tend to have lower turnout, especially in off-year elections The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the construction of the data. Section III presents background on the history of television's introduction. Section IV discusses the paper's identification strategy and the empirical specification, Section V analyzes the effect of television on turnout, and Section VI looks at informational crowding out as a possible mechanism. Section VII concludes.
II Data
Data on the availability of television in each US city between 1940 and 1970 was compiled from various issues of Television Factbook [Television Digest 1948 -1970 , a yearly data book on the television industry used by advertisers, equipment manufacturers, station managers, and others.
The books profile each station operating in each year, giving its location, signal strength, network affiliation, ownership, and starting date.
To define the geographic region reached by stations in a particular city, I use the Designated Market Areas (DMAs), which are the current industry standard. Every county in the US is assigned to one DMA such that all counties in a given DMA have a majority of their measured viewing hours on stations broadcasting from that market. 7 These definitions are based on viewership as of 2003, rather than in the historical period I am analyzing. However, since the broadcasting strength of stations is regulated by the FCC to avoid interference with neighboring markets, the area reached by particular stations has not changed significantly. 8 I take the DMA definitions as a reasonable approximation of the viewing area of stations in the 1950's and 60's, and calculate the first year each county received television as the first year in which a station in the DMA broadcast for at least four months. 9 One way to check the validity of the television data is to compare the recorded entry dates to county-level television penetration from the 1950 and 1960 censuses. Figure I shows 1950 penetration by the measured first year of television. The average penetration in DMAs whose first station began broadcasting before 1950 ranges from 8 percent in the 1949 group to over 35 percent in the 1941 group, while the average for post-1950 DMAs never exceeds 1 percent. A similar comparison using 1960 data shows that the handful of DMAs that got television in 1960 or later 7 In a handful of cases, a county is split across multiple DMAs. (An example is El Dorado county in California. The eastern half of the county is assigned to the Reno DMA and the western half to the Sacramento DMA.) In these cases, I assign the entire county to the larger of the two DMAs. Dropping these counties does not meaningfully alter the results [see Gentzkow 2005] .
8 I have verified this by spot-checking the DMA definitions against coverage maps from the 1960's. 9 In most cases, I use the date that a station began commercial broadcasts, as regulated by the FCC. The exceptions are two stations-KTLA in Los Angeles and WTTG in Washington, DC-that began large-scale experimental broadcasts and subsequently converted to become commercial stations. In these cases, I use the stations' experimental start dates. already had extensive television ownership. These DMAs are small-often consisting of only one or two counties-and could all receive some television broadcasts from neighboring markets. I therefore omit all counties in DMAs whose first television station began broadcasting in 1960 or later. This applies to 13 out of 205 DMAs, accounting for .7 percent of the US population as of 1950. If these counties are included, the measured effects of television are attenuated somewhat, but remain statistically significant.
I combine the television data with county-level election returns compiled by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 10 The data give total votes as a percentage of the legally eligible electorate, as defined by contemporary citizenship, race, sex, and age criteria. 11
This does not take account of other eligibility criteria based on residency, or status as a convicted felon. Not all counties have data for all years, and I include counties if they have turnout data available for a majority of the years from 1940-1972, leaving a total of 3,081 counties. 12 I use as my key dependent measure the number of votes cast for congress as a fraction of the eligible electorate. To assess political knowledge and the use of media for political information, I match the television data to the 1952 National Election Study. 14 This is a nationally representative sample of 1,899 voting-age citizens interviewed both before and after the 1952 election. The timing of this election is ideal, because it was the last year of the FCC freeze and so maximizes the idiosyncratic variation in television access. The survey included detailed questions on political attitudes, voting 10 The study is entitled "Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972" (ICPSR study number 8611) .
11 This is the standard measure of turnout, and is considered superior to the measure with number of registered voters in the denominator. According to Prysby [1987, p. 113] : "Calculating turnout as a proportion of registered voters... is generally inappropriate in the American context, given the large numbers of people who are eligible to register but fail to do so. In fact, the available research indicates that most nonvoters are not registered".
12 Rusk [2001] provides a detailed discussion of the construction of historical turnout data, including possible errors in the ICPSR data. The results are unchanged if I use a balanced panel only including counties that have data for all years. 13 Three major events that affected turnout are visible in Figures II and III . First, the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, extending the franchise to women. This has frequently been cited as a reason for the drop in presidential turnout in the 1920 and 1924 elections as it took several years for voting rates among women to reach near-parity with those of men [Rusk 2001 ]. Second, there was a sharp drop in turnout during and immediately following World War II. I have not seen a convincing analysis of what caused this drop, but I would speculate that it could result from sharply reduced participation among military personnel stationed overseas. Third, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment passed in 1971 required that all states extend the franchise to 18-21-year-olds, a group that historically has significantly lower turnout rates than older voters. Kleppner [1982, p. 123] To justify the empirical analysis that follows, it is important to establish that the diffusion of television was rapid enough that its effects could be felt within a relatively short window of time.
One reason is that many aspects of the television industry-from the format of newscasts, to the structure of the networks-had been developed and perfected by the radio industry. Also, the technical and logistical aspects of television had been largely worked out well before the end of the war. A number of technological innovations during the war years, including better cameras and a technology for re-broadcasting cinema film, further improved quality. As Barnouw [1990] writes, the prospects for television's growth after the war were "explosive":
Electronic assembly lines, freed from production of electronic war materiel, were ready to turn out picture tubes and television sets. Consumers, long confronted by wartime shortages and rationing, had accumulated savings and were ready to buy. Manufacturers of many kinds, ready to switch from armaments back to consumer goods, were eager to
We can look at the pattern of television's growth in a number of different ways. Some evidence was presented in Figure I , which showed substantial diffusion of television ownership by 1950 (13 percent on average in markets that had television). Figure IV While the analysis in this paper does not extend beyond 1970, it is worth examining briefly how television has changed since then. If the scale of television continued to increase, the long-run effects could be even greater than those documented here. On the other hand, if television began providing substantially more political information, some of the effects could actually be reversed.
In reality, the former seems more likely than the latter. The time devoted to television viewing evidence that people were getting more political information from television in the late 1990's than they were in 1970. 16 Looking at local news in particular, the evidence suggests that viewership remained constant or even fell. 17
IV Identification and Empirical Specification
Although television is widely believed to have large effects on outcomes from politics to crime to education, identifying its causal effect has proven to be difficult. The most common research design uses cross-sectional data with the key right-hand side variable being hours of television viewing or number of television stations. Such analyses suffer from potentially severe bias caused by correlation of the television measures with unobserved characteristics of individuals or localities.
Panel-data designs using variation over time in the number of stations (or more ambitiously the availability or price of cable) could potentially address some of this bias. However, the impact of the marginal station or cable subscriber on aggregate viewing patterns is likely to be very small, making it difficult to detect effects in small samples.
The key innovation of this study is to use panel data from a period in which the variation over time in television's availability was far from marginal. As already described, many counties went from having essentially no television viewing to having 80 percent of households watching an average of 4.5 hours per day in as little as 5 years. Furthermore, the last significant group of counties to receive television got it a full 10 years after the post-war growth of television began in the largest cities. This suggests a differences-in-differences research design that asks whether changes in political information or voter turnout were correlated with the timing of television's introduction.
Two key features of the data allow me to strengthen this basic identification strategy. The first is the fact that both World War II and the FCC freeze were exogenous shocks to the pattern of television's introduction across markets. The second is the fact that individual television stations broadcast over a large area, reaching a heterogeneous group of counties.
To examine the first of these, Figure V shows the fraction of the US population in counties receiving television for the first time in each year. Three distinct groupings are clearly visible: 16 The fraction of respondents in the National Election Study who said they had watched programs about the presidential campaign on television was lower in all but one year of 1980-2000 than in any year between 1960 and 1972. Network evening news viewership was flat from 1970-1980 and then declined by more than 50 percent between 1980 and 2000 [Nielsen Media Research 2003] . Some of the decline in the 1980's may have been offset by growing cable news viewership, but this does not appear to be true of the 1990's, as the fraction of people saying they watch CNN "regularly" or "sometimes" was not substantially higher in 2000 than in 1990 [Pew Research Center 2002] . 17 In 1972 and 1996, National Election Study respondents were asked how often they watched local newscasts. The questions were different in the two years, so are not directly comparable, but they do not show evidence of a large increase: 10 percent said they "never" watched local news in 1972 and another 8 percent said they watched "rarely"; in 1996, 15 percent said they had not watched at all in the last week and 5 percent said they had watched only one day. Furthermore, the fraction of people who say they "frequently" watch the local news fell from 76 percent in 1993 to 56 percent in 2000 [Pew Research Center 2002]. counties that had television before the war, starting in 1940; counties that got television between 1945 and 1951, with the bulk in 1948 and 1949; and counties that got their first station after the freeze, beginning in 1952. The gaps between these three groups are much greater than they would have been had exogenous events not intervened, and this added variation adds identification power.
While the war and the freeze changed the timing of television's introduction across markets, they did not necessarily change the ordering. Predictably, it was in the largest and wealthiest television markets that potential entrants found it profitable to apply for licenses and begin broadcasting in the earliest years. Table I shows county-level demographics for the three major groupings of counties: counties that got television earlier were larger, more urban, with higher income, median age, and schooling; the earliest group also had substantially higher turnout in the 1940 election.
Although the panel design controls for both cross-sectional differences correlated with the timing of television's introduction and common changes over time, the results could still be biased if there were negative shocks to information or voting that hit the largest and richest cities in the mid-1940's, medium-sized cities in the late-1940's, and small cities and rural areas in the early-1950's.
One way to address this issue is to make use of observable county characteristics. Note, for example, that the largest differences in observables shown in Table I are between the first two groups; the only large differences between the 1945-1951 and post-freeze groups are in population, population density, and percent urban. This suggests that spurious correlation is likely to be less of a problem if attention is restricted to the latter groups. 18 Furthermore, a simple regression analysis confirms that market size and income were the key determinants of the timing of television's introduction. A linear regression at the DMA level of the year television was introduced on log population and log total income yields an R 2 of .69. When the residuals from this regression are regressed on percent urban, percent high school, median age, percent non-white, population density, median income, and 1940 turnout, the coefficients are neither individually nor jointly significant at the 10 percent level. The largest individual t statistics are on percent urban, percent non-white, and population density (-1.46, -1.17, and -1.04 respectively). This suggests that controls for population and income may eliminate much of the spurious correlation.
An even more powerful way to address this issue is to exploit the large and heterogeneous broadcast area of individual television stations. Consider Figure VI which shows a map of the Chicago DMA and the characteristics of the counties that compose it. Although Chicago was the second largest television market in 1950 and the DMA as a whole is highly urban, dense, and wealthy, the counties that compose it are heterogeneous. They range from Newton County, IN, which has no urban population, a density of 27 people per square mile, and a median income (in 1950 dollars) of $2,778, to Cook County, IL, which has 99 percent urban population, a density of 18 Gentzkow [2005] verifies that the results are robust to excluding the earliest television counties. 4726 people per square mile, and a median income of $4,085. If there were bias in the basic panel specification caused by shocks to voting in dense urban areas in the mid-1940's, this should show up in the voting patterns of Cook County but not Newton County. A robust way to identify television's effect would therefore be to compare counties that are similar on dimensions like density and percent urban (taking only rural counties like Newton, for example) and ask whether they saw changes in voting around the time television was introduced. The variation in the timing of television would then be driven by whether a county happened to fall within the roughly 100-mile radius of television broadcasts from a large city, with the identifying assumption being that proximity at this distance is uncorrelated with unobserved shocks that changed the level of turnout over time.
The basic framework for the analysis is a fixed effects regression of the form:
where i indexes counties, t indexes years, and r indexes census regions. Y it is an outcome measure of interest, α i and δ rt are location and region-time fixed effects respectively, and it is a random shock. T V it is some measure of the scale of television in county i and time t. X it includes observable county characteristics (that change over time) and other functions of these characteristics described below. It also includes the absolute difference of the Republican and Democratic vote percentages, a competitiveness measure that has been shown to have a strong effect on turnout [see Stromberg 2004] . Note that in specifications using the National Election Study data, the variation is only cross-sectional and so I cannot include the α i and δ rt terms in equation 1.
I use two approaches to exploit within-DMA heterogeneity. The first is to include in X it interactions between key county-level observables in a base year and a fourth-order polynomial in time. This controls flexibly for differences in the time path of the dependent variables whose correlation with television is driven by the endogenous pattern of television's introduction. Based on the analysis of this timing described above, I include interactions with 1960 log population, 1959 log total income, and turnout in the 1940 election. 19 I also check that the results are robust to including interactions with 1950 percent urban, 1950 population density, and 1950 percent nonwhite, the remaining characteristics with t statistics greater than one in the timing regression. The second approach is to partition the counties into thirds along observable dimensions and run the analysis separately for each group. This more flexible specification allows the region-time dummies to be estimated separately for each group. It is also a literal implementation of the experiment described above-comparing similar counties that differ in the timing of television because of their proximity to large cities. 20 The remaining issue is how to model the effect of television. There are several reasons to expect that its impact would not be a one-time discontinuous change, but would rather grow gradually over time. The quantity and quality of programming increased steadily following television's initial introduction, television ownership diffused slowly across households, and the process by which television is linked to voting-substitution among media leading to a depreciating stock of information and ultimately to reduced participation in elections-would be expected to take effect gradually over time.
A natural starting point, then, would be to allow T V it to grow linearly over time, beginning in the year when the first station starts broadcasting in county i. That is,
where τ i is the year television is introduced and I() is the indicator function. Because penetration of television was negligible before the end of World War II, I assign a first television year or 1946 to all counties that had stations before that date. I also include separate trends for presidential and off-year elections. In some specifications I also include the squared value of T V it to allow the effect to grow weaker over time.
To further check the validity of the identification strategy, Table II presents results from a series of placebo regressions. The goal is to test whether once the effect of the key observables is partialed out, variation in the timing of television's introduction is orthogonal to the remaining observables.
The timing of television is measured by a dummy equal to one if a county received their first station after the FCC freeze. 21 Column 1 of the table displays the F statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the remaining observables are all equal to zero. Column 2 shows the number of the coefficients that are individually significant at the 5 percent level.
The first set of tests look at whether the timing of television is orthogonal to the full vector of observables once we restrict attention to subsets of counties. The F statistics here are from a simple regression of the post-freeze dummy on the eight demographics shown in Table I and region dummies. 22 For the lowest third of counties by population, income per capita, and 1940 turnout, 20 A third way to exploit within-DMA heterogeneity would be to use a matching algorithm. As a robustness check, I have estimated the effect of television using the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm of Abadie and Imbens [2004] . I define a binary treatment variable equal to one if a county received television before the end of the FCC freeze (1952), and two dependent variables: the change in turnout between the presidential elections of 1944 and 1952; and the change in turnout between the off-year elections of 1946 and 1954. I match counties based on 1960 log population and log per capita income and 1950 median age, population density, percent urban, percent non-white, percent with high-school diploma, and median income. I consider specifications with and without bias correction, with between one and four matched observations, and with heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. The sample average treatment effect of television is significant at the .1 percent level in all specifications, and roughly 50 percent larger for off-year turnout than for presidential-year turnout. 21 An alternative is to use the year television was introduced as the left-hand variable. In this case, the F-statistic for the lowest third by population density is no longer significant, while the F-statistic for the whole sample regression becomes significant at the one percent level. 22 Because the subset regressions below allow a different set of time dummies by region, the region dummies are treated as incidental controls here and not included in the F-test. the hypothesis that the demographic coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected. It is rejected at the 5 percent level for the lowest third by density and percent with high school education, and at the 1 percent level for the lowest third by percent urban. In no case is more than one demographic coefficient individually significant. This suggests that focusing on subsets of counties removes much, but possibly not all, correlation between the timing of television and county characteristics.
The next test looks at whether the timing of television is orthogonal to observables in the full sample once we control for population, income, 1940 turnout, and region dummies (the variables that are interacted with a time polynomial in the main specification). In a regression of these residuals on the remaining demographics the demographics are neither jointly nor individually significant, confirming that the remaining variation is largely idiosyncratic.
The final test looks at the orthogonality of television in the National Election Study sample.
Here, the data is at the individual level and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent's county had television in 1952. The specification tests whether individual respondent characteristics predict having television once region dummies and county-level population, income, and percent non-white are controlled for. The twenty-eight right-hand variables are neither jointly nor individually significant, again confirming that the remaining variation in timing is idiosyncratic.
V Did Television Affect Turnout? V.A Relative Trends
As a first step in analyzing the effect of television on turnout, I present direct comparisons of turnout in counties divided into three groups by the year their first television station began broadcasting. This is a coarser approach than will be possible with the fixed effects model of equation 1, but has the advantage of allowing one to look at the data directly.
As was clear from Figure V , the natural groups are pre-1945, 1945-1951, and 1952 and after. If television reduced voter turnout, we would expect the first two groups to show a negative trend relative to the third group in the years up to 1952. The relative decline should begin in 1946 for the first group (recall that television did not begin to diffuse widely until after the war), and sometime between 1946 and 1948 for the second group. A clear relative decline is apparent for both groups, beginning in 1946. That the negative trend is slightly larger for the first group is consistent with the early areas having relatively high income and density and thus being the places where television ownership diffused the fastest (a point which is examined more rigorously when I add interaction terms to the regression analysis). For the first group, the relative trend also clearly flattens out beginning in 1954, the year that most counties in the reference group first had television. No clear flattening is visible for the second group. Table III 
V.B Years of Television Regressions
Table IV presents the core set of regressions in this section. These are again based on equation 1 but differ from the relative trends regression in that rather than using a coarse division of counties into three groups and looking at the first two groups relative to the third, the T V it variable is defined as a separate trend for each county beginning in the year it first received television. That is, T V it = I(t ≥ τ i )(t − τ i ), where τ i is the year television was introduced in county i and I() is the indicator function. The first two columns show the coefficients on this variable in specifications with county and region-year dummies alone, and then adding time polynomial interactions and demographics. The results show that television caused a significant decline in voter turnout. The magnitude of this effect drops with the added controls but remains strongly significant. In the complete specification, introducing television causes turnout to fall by .136 percentage points per year. 23 More precisely, T V it is specified as four separate terms: an interaction of a dummy for membership in the first group and a time trend for the years [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] ; an interaction of the first group dummy and a trend for 1952+; an interaction of a second group dummy and a trend for [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] ; and an interaction of a second group dummy and a trend for 1952+.
The next two column repeat these specifications allowing different trends for presidential and off-year congressional elections. The off-year coefficient is significantly negative and suggests that television reduced turnout by .196 percentage points per year in the specification with controls.
For presidential years, on the other hand, the coefficient is significantly negative in the simplest specification, but it is much smaller and insignificant with the full set of controls. In the final specification, the point estimate is a negative effect of .067 percentage points per year. The final three columns add additional interactions between the time polynomial and percent urban, population density, and percent non-white respectively. These were the three characteristics, after those already included in the interactions, that had the highest t statistics in the DMA-level regression of television's timing on demographics (though none were significant). The results do not change substantially when these interactions are included, suggesting that the remaining variation identifying the television coefficient is largely idiosyncratic.
The results presented so far cast doubt on the hypothesis that the apparent effect of television is driven by spurious correlation with some unrelated shock to voting. The effect remains strong and significant in a variety of specifications even after allowing interactions between a flexible function of time and all of the major correlates of the timing of television's introduction. This means in particular that any factor influencing voting whose correlation with television was driven by city size or income-for example, a social change that began in the largest cities in the 1940's and then diffused outward-would not bias the coefficients.
It is possible to perform an even stronger check on the validity of the results. As discussed earlier, a more direct way to exploit the fact that television stations broadcast to a heterogeneous group of counties is to perform the analysis using only those that are demographically similarfor example, comparing turnout patterns in rural counties that happened to get television early because of proximity to a large city and those that got television late. In Table V, I divide counties into thirds by different observable characteristics and then perform the analysis separately on each third. The table reports the coefficient on years of television from a regression of turnout on this variable, county dummies, and separate year dummies by region (as well as the usual competitiveness measure). The first column of the first row, for example, reports this coefficient using only the smallest counties.
The results provide further evidence that the estimates represent a causal effect of television.
The television coefficient remains significant in all but one of the eighteen specifications, and has the correct sign in all of them. The magnitude does not vary in a systematic way across thirds by population or percent urban, and is actually largest in the least dense counties, providing strong evidence against the hypothesis that the results are driven by changes taking place in the largest cities. (Note that even if there were shocks to large cities that reverberated throughout the broader television markets, we would expect the coefficients to be smaller for the less urban counties.) On the other hand, the magnitude is higher in quartiles with higher levels of income and education, consistent with the expectation that these would be the counties where television diffused the fastest. Finally, the effect is larger for counties whose turnout at the beginning of the period was highest. One interpretation is that the voting population in these counties in 1940 included a large number of relatively marginal voters whose turnout was more affected by the introduction of television.
V.C Interactions and Non-Linear Effects
The next step in the analysis is to look in more detail at the way the magnitude of the television effect varies with county characteristics. The most obvious reason that the effect might differ is because television ownership (and in later years multiple set and color ownership) diffused faster and more broadly in some places than others. The picture is more complicated, however, because we would also expect the sensitivity of turnout to a given change in information consumption to vary with demographics. For example, if wealthier or more educated individuals have high levels of information regardless of media consumption, they would tend to be further away from the turnout margin, and less affected by the introduction of television.
To structure the analysis of the interactions, I construct two vectors of fitted values: predicted television diffusion and predicted turnout sensitivity. The first is based on a regression of 1960 television penetration on the census year demographics from Table I and dummy variables for the year in which television was introduced. The fitted values are from the demographics alone.
The second is derived by asking how sensitivity to the closeness of elections varies across counties.
Although there is no reason to expect the reaction to variation in election closeness to be identical to the reaction to information, we would expect that counties that had a large number of marginal voters would respond more to both. I regress turnout on county fixed effects, time-region fixed effects, the absolute difference in Republican and Democratic vote shares, and interactions of the absolute difference with the census-year demographics from Table I and 1940 turnout. 24 The fitted values are the predicted marginal effect of the absolute difference in vote shares. 25 Table VI presents turnout regressions that allow a heterogeneous effect of television. The first column includes interactions with the full set of county demographics. The negative trend introduced by television is larger in counties with low population, high income, low education, high percent non-white, high density, and high 1940 turnout. These results are hard to interpret because they may conflate differences in the diffusion of television and the fraction of marginal voters. 24 County turnout in 1940 is allowed to affect sensitivity but not diffusion-this is based on the assumption that unusually high turnout may reflect the participation of a large block of marginal voters but should not directly affect television set purchases.
25 See Gentzkow [2005] for more detailed discussion of the construction of these predicted values.
Column 2 includes an interaction with predicted television penetration in 1960 and shows that the television effect is largest in those counties where ownership diffused the fastest. The effect is large, with a one standard deviation increase in diffusion more than doubling the television effect. Column 3 includes an interaction with the predicted sensitivity of turnout and shows that the television effect is largest where the fraction of marginal voters is highest. A one standard deviation increase in this variable increases the television effect by approximately 60 percent. Column 4 includes both the diffusion and sensitivity measures. The magnitude of the former falls slightly and the magnitude of the latter increases slightly. Both remain highly significant. Column 5 adds an interaction with the year television was introduced, which is small and insignificant.
The last three columns of Table VII address the question of how the effect of television changes over time by including both years of television and years of television squared. One weakness of a research design that relies on relative changes between counties over time is that such nonlinearities will be difficult to separate from heterogeneity across counties. Recall, for example, that the relative trend regressions in Table III show that turnout in the early television counties neither rises or falls relative to the later counties after 1952 (when all counties have television). This could reflect a constant linear television effect whose magnitude is the same across counties. Alternatively, it could reflect an effect that gets smaller over time combined with a smaller effect overall for the later counties. The results in columns 6 through 8 show that the estimated quadratic term is highly sensitive to which interaction terms are included. It is positive in all specifications (suggesting the effect is getting smaller over time), but it is only significant in the regression with only the first TV year interaction. The magnitude ranges from .002 (implying that it would take 93 years for the effect to die out entirely) to .0255 (implying that this would take only 6 years). This suggests that there is some non-linearity, but that the exact functional form is beyond the power of this data to identify convincingly. It also suggests that estimates of the total impact of television over a long period of time are unlikely to be very precise.
V.D Magnitudes
We can evaluate the magnitude of the effects documented above in a number of ways. The main specifications in Table IV imply that television decreased off-year turnout by approximately 2 percent each decade after it was introduced. They imply that it decreased presidential turnout by .7 percent, although this estimate is not significantly different from zero. As context for these numbers, the overall negative trend in non-south turnout since the 1950's was 3.4 percent per decade, and the negative trend in presidential turnout was 3.2 percent per decade, implying that television accounted for 60 percent of the off-year decline and (possibly) 22 percent of the presidential decline. Although these effects assume that the per-year decline in voting remains constant over time, and so might overstate how much of the decline television explains, they probably do not do so by much because most of the aggregate decline took place before 1970.
To more accurately assess the effect on overall turnout, it is necessary to take account of the fact that television was introduced to different counties at different times and that the effect was larger in some counties than others. To do so, I estimate counter-factual aggregate turnout levels based on the estimated parameters. The preferred specification is the non-linear model in column 8 of Table VI to which I add separate television effects for presidential and off-years-this allows both a squared term in years of television and a full set of interactions. I also check the results for the basic specification in column 3 of Table IV and the specification with interaction terms only in column 5 of Table VI, As stressed above, however, the difficulty of separately identifying a non-linear effect within counties and heterogeneity across counties means that these estimates can vary significantly depending on the specification. Thus, the specification with interactions but no non-linear term gives effects of 9.5 percent for off years and 6.2 percent for presidential years, while the basic specification with neither non-linear terms nor heterogeneity gives effects of 4.1 percent and 1.3 percent respectively. The differences across these models are intuitive: we would expect the model without non-linear terms to overstate television's effect when we extrapolate far beyond the introduction date, since the per year impact is not allowed to fall over time; omitting interactions should cause us to understate the aggregate effect because the largest counties were also the ones that had the largest effects. Nevertheless, the variability of the estimated magnitudes suggest they should be interpreted with a great deal of caution.
VI How did Television Affect Turnout?
In the introduction, I argued that crowding out of political information provides a plausible mechanism linking television and voting. The goal of this section is to present a range of evidence consistent with this prediction. I will not be able to identify precisely how much of the effect on turnout worked through this channel, but the results build a strong case that information played a critical role.
VI.A Substitution among Media
The first kind of evidence comes from examining the extent to which television caused substitution away from other news sources-specifically newspapers and radio. This is relevant because the amount of political information provided by television in its early years was substantially less than that provided by either newspapers or radio, making it unlikely that a dramatic shift away from the latter media would lead the public to become better informed. Predictably given the large economies of scale in television broadcasting relative to newspaper publishing, the difference was especially large for more local elections. and 1955, network radio had about 7 times as much regularly scheduled news as network television [Sterling 1984] . Moreover, the difference between television and other media did not disappear after the 1960's. Morgan and Shanahan [1992] summarize a number of studies in the political science literature showing that those who turn to television news as their main source of information have lower levels of political knowledge, trust government less, and are less likely to participate in the political process in ways other than voting than those who rely on other media. This evidence is primarily correlational, but it is suggestive of the way television differs from other media.
Evidence for the greater difference in local coverage comes from a series of Roper Surveys conducted in 1952, 1964, 1968, and 1972 . The percentage of respondents saying television was their most important source of information about national elections was about twice as large as the fraction saying newspapers. For local elections, on the other hand, the percentage saying television was the most important source was 25-35 percent lower than the percentage saying newspapers [Sterling 1984, p. 165] . Similar evidence for later years comes from the National Election Studies which show that for the presidential years from 1970 to 1980, more respondents heard about the election on television than in newspapers, with the reverse pattern holding for off-year elections.
Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence is Mondak [1995] . This study is based on a survey What remains is to show that television indeed reduced consumption of newspapers and radio. A more direct way to look at substitution among media for political information specifically is to use data from the 1952 National Election Study. The primary limitation of this data is that it is a single cross-section, and so does not allow me to control for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity among counties. However, 1952 was the end of the FCC freeze and so was the year in which idiosyncratic variation in the availability of television was greatest. This is confirmed by the placebo regression in Table II : after controlling for DMA log income and log population, county percent non-white, and region dummies, the dummy for TV availability is uncorrelated with observable individual characteristics. All regressions in this section include DMA log income and log population; region dummies; county percent non-white, population, percent urban, population density, median age, median income, median schooling; and individual level dummies for age, education occupation, sex, white race, highest income category, political party identification, and missing values of each control, as well as continuous controls for number of children and log income.
The independent variable of interest is a dummy for whether or not the respondent's county had television. Table VII shows results from three specifications in which the dependent variables are responses to the following questions:
Did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?
Did you listen to speeches or discussions about the campaign on the radio?
Did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?
The results show a large and highly significant substitution effect. Respondents in television counties were 11.6 percent less likely to have read about the campaign in the newspaper and 28.5 percent less likely to have heard about the campaign on the radio. Each coefficient is significant at the one percent level, and their magnitudes are large relative to the 79 percent and 70 percent of the overall sample getting campaign information from newspapers and radio respectively. Note, too, that both the newspaper and radio variables are positively correlated with education and income.
Since counties with higher education and income were more likely to have television, this argues against the radio and newspaper coefficients being driven by unobservable variation in the overall level of economic development. The final column verifies that substantially more people watched programs about the campaign on television in the counties coded as having television in 1952. This is primarily a check on the validity of the data. The percentage watching is also large, at 45 percent, suggesting television was already an important political outlet. 26
VI.B Direct Measures of Political Information
The second kind of evidence that I present on television and information also comes from the 1952 National Election Study, but concerns direct measures of political knowledge. The first set of questions come from the pre-election survey. Respondents were asked:
Who do you plan to vote for as United States senator?
How about congressman? Who do you plan to vote for there?
Who do you think you will vote for as governor here in [state]?
These were free response questions, and the data indicates whether the respondent mentioned a candidate actually running in the race, an incorrect candidate, or a party with no mention of a specific candidate. 27 The question was only asked of respondents who said they intended to vote in the election (I drop other respondents from this analysis). For each question, I create a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent correctly named a candidate running in the race and equal 26 This coefficient is slightly lower than the percentage of individuals in the overall sample watching on television, partly reflecting the fact that some individuals not in television counties reported having watched campaign programs. This could result both from travel to other counties during the campaign season and measurement error in the television variable. 27 A question was also asked about presidential voting intentions but it was coded differently and did not distinguish correct and incorrect responses. to zero otherwise. Because races for senate and governor are statewide while congressional races are more local (California currently has 54 separate races, for example), we would expect television stations to devote substantially less coverage to any given congressional race. This suggests that the negative effect of television should be largest for the congressional question.
The second set of questions took a similar form, but was asked retrospectively after the election.
Respondents were asked whether or not they voted for each office, and if they answered affirmatively, were asked "who did you vote for?" This was again a free response question and was coded as above.
In the analysis of this question, I use only those who voted for the relevant office. I create a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent correctly named a candidate.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table VIII . The regressions all include the same controls as those in Table VII , and differ only in the dependent variables and the number of observations. The first thing to note about the table is that all but one of the education and income coefficients are positive, and the majority are significant. This provides some confirmation that the dependent variables are picking up what they are intended to. It also suggests that omitted variables positively correlated with the overall level of economic development (the main predictor of early television entry) would bias the results against finding a negative effect on information.
The coefficients on the pre-election variables are negative and significant for knowledge of congressional candidates, and positive and insignificant for knowledge of senatorial and gubernatorial candidates. This is consistent with the prediction that the negative effect should be larger for the more local race. One might have expected some negative effects on the senatorial and gubernatorial variables, however, since these races still receive limited coverage on the national network programs that make up a large portion of viewership. The magnitude of the congressional coefficient is very large-having television predicts being 24.8 percent less likely to provide the name of a congressional candidate, while only 26.1 percent of the overall sample was able to do so. Note, however, that since television areas have higher education and income,the regression does not predict that the fraction answering in areas with television would be zero.
The post-election coefficients are all negative, with the largest effect on knowledge of congressional candidates. Both the senate and house coefficients are significant. Having television predicts being 34 percent less likely to name a candidate for congress, 24 percent less likely to name a candidate for senate, and 11 percent less likely to name a candidate for governor. This compares to 49 percent, 66 percent, and 76 percent respectively naming such candidates in the sample as a whole. Why the post-election effects are larger than the pre-election effects is not immediately obvious, although it may simply reflect the fact that this is a more highly selected group (it only includes those who actually voted) and so had higher baseline levels of knowledge overall.
Taken together these results provide strong evidence that television caused substitution away from newspapers and radio, and that this in turn caused a large drop in levels of information about candidates in the 1952 election, with the strongest and most significant effects on information about congressional candidates.
VI.C Interaction with Number of Congressional Districts
The final piece of evidence I report is the interaction between the television effect and the number of congressional districts in a television market. Recall that the contrast between presidential and off-year congressional elections is the key piece of evidence tying together the information and turnout results. Congressional elections are less covered on television and extensively covered in newspapers, and these are the races for which the effect of television on both information and turnout is largest. The number of districts provides an additional "difference" to test: within congressional elections, television coverage should be limited in television markets that are fragmented into many districts. This should make the television effect on both information and turnout in congressional races largest in such markets. Importantly, the number of districts should not change the television effect in presidential years.
Of course the number of districts in a market is far from exogenous. Because representation in the House of Representatives is proportional, the number of districts in a state is a mechanical function of population. The number of districts in a television market will also depend on population, but the relationship will be less perfect, since district boundaries are often highly irregular and do not follow county boundaries. Once population is controlled for, the remaining variation should be relatively idiosyncratic.
I define the number of districts in a DMA based on the county-level ICPSR voting data. These data report the congressional district of each county, or the number of different districts in the county if there is more than one. Unfortunately, since they do not identify the individual districts in a multiple-district county, there are some ambiguous cases. For example, if county A and county B have two districts each, they might together account for anywhere from two to four. I use the upper-bound measure (in this case four), assuming that all such districts are unique. This will likely overstate the variance in districts, biasing the magnitude of the estimated effect downward, but the ordering of counties in terms of number of districts should remain roughly the same.
I first ask whether the effect of television on information about congressional candidates is more negative in markets with more congressional districts. I repeat the National Election Study regressions of Table VIII where the dependent variable is being able to name a House candidate both before and after the election. I add interactions between television and both population and the number of districts, as well as levels of the latter variables. I do not present these results, but the interaction between television and number of districts is not significant in either specification.
It is small and positive for the pre-election question and small and negative for the post-election question, with the t statistic in both cases less than one. In contrast with the analysis of the National Election Study, these results are significant and align closely with what the information mechanism would predict. The regressions are the same as the main specification (Table IV) except that they include separate interactions between number of districts and years of television for presidential and off-year elections. They also include an interaction between years of television and population as a control. The first column shows the regression with only county and region-year fixed effects and the second column adds time-polynomial interactions and levels of demographics. The effect of television on off-year turnout is significantly more negative in markets with more congressional districts, with a one standard deviation increase in the number of districts increasing the magnitude by 18 percent in the final specification. In contrast, the number of districts does not change the presidential year effect once the full set of controls are added, and the difference between the off-year and presidential interactions is significant at the one percent level. These results are not conclusive given the failure to find first-stage effects on the National Election Study measure. But they do provide some additional evidence that crowding out of information may link television and turnout.
VII Conclusions
Taken together, the results of this paper tell a consistent story. Although television did provide a new medium for delivering political information, it also offered consumers a wide array of new ways to use their leisure time. The fact that even in 1950 the average television household was watching for four and a half hours per day makes clear what a dramatic improvement television was over previous entertainment technologies. Faced with both a reduction in a price of information and a much larger drop in the price of entertainment, consumers responded by substituting away from the former and toward the latter. This substitution was largest where the information provided by television was most limited: local elections.
The evidence also shows that television also caused fewer voters to go to the polls. This effect was particularly strong in exactly those elections where the drop in information was shown to be the largest. The evidence linking television to a drop in voting is robust to partitioning counties into groups by demographic characteristics, controlling explicitly for demographics, and allowing non-linear functions of time interacted with demographics. The magnitude of the effect interacts in an intuitive way with observed characteristics of counties. Although this analysis cannot identify conclusively the mechanism by which television affected turnout, it strongly supports the hypothesis that crowding out of information played an important role.
Among the motivations for this study discussed in the introduction was a paradox: the coincidence of dramatic improvements in media and education with a sharp decline in turnout. These results provide a partial resolution to this paradox by showing that not only did television fail to increase information and turnout, it was an important cause of the decline, explaining half of the drop in off-year turnout since 1950, and possibly a quarter of the drop in presidential years.
Furthermore, the logic that underlies these results may apply more broadly. The improvements in media and education that are at the root of the apparent paradox have been accompanied by a proliferation of new ways to spend leisure time, from cable, to video games, to DVDs, to the Internet. While a conclusive answer will require detailed study of these broader trends, it would not be surprising to find that this expansion of choices led to further crowding out of political engagement. 4 1940 1941 1942 1945 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1970 Year of first TV station in DMA 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1950 1940 -1944 1945 -51 1952 and later Percent urban (1950 The two columns show F statistics for the joint significance of the demographic variables in each regression and the number of coefficients significant at the 5 percent level respectively. The "lowest third of counties" regressions use only counties falling into the lowest third of the indicated demographics; the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if television was introduced in 1952 or later and the righthand-side variables are log total income, log population, percent urban, percent non-white, percent high school, median age, population density, and 1940 turnout; region dummies are also included but not reported in the F test. In the "full sample" regression, the dependent variable is the residual from a regression of the post-freeze dummy on log population, log total income, 1940 turnout, and region dummies; the right-hand variables are percent urban, percent non-white, percent high school, median age, and population density. In the "National Election Study" regression, the dependent variable is the residual from a regression of a dummy for having TV in 1952 on DMA log population and log total income, county percent non-white, and region dummies; the right-hand side variables are individual-level dummies for male, white, age categories, education categories, occupation categories, income in the highest category, and missing values, as well as number of children and log income.
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(1) (2) (3) Table IV . Each column gives the coefficient from regressions using only counties that fell into the given third of the data and each row specifies the demographic characteristic on which counties were divided.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Standard errors clustered by county. Coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions. In addition to controls shown, all regressions include individual-level dummies for age, occupation, sex, white race, highest income category, political party identification, and missing values of each control, as well as a continuous control for number of children. Each also includes controls for DMA-level log income and population; county-level population, percent urban, population density, percent non-white, median age, median income, and median schooling; and dummies for census regions. The TV dummy is one if the respondent's county had television prior to 1952. The "any campaign info" variables are dummies equal to one if the respondent reported obtaining information from the given source. Table  VII . "Able to name candidate pre-election" variables are dummies equal to one if the respondent gave the name of a candidate that they intended to vote for the specified office in the pre-election interview, and equal to zero if they simply named a party or mentioned a candidate not running; respondents who said they did not intend to vote for the specified office are omitted. "Able to name candidate post-election" variables are defined analogously for the post-election survey.
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